“The First Landing of Christopher Columbus in America” (1862), Dióscoro Puebla
THE DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY
Help, master, help! here's a fish hangs in the net, like a poor man's right in the law.
The abridgement of the sovereignty of the American Indians continues. And the Supreme Court of the United States of America remains the supreme engine for the demise of Indian sovereignty now over five centuries since Columbus made first contact on the beach at San Salvador. Over five centuries of subjugation! Some justice.
Consider this important case. In 1985 the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed that the Oneida Indian Nation of New York (OIN) could maintain a claim for “ancient wrongdoings.” In particular, the court asserted that in these cases both national and state governments were complicit in having wronged the Oneida nation. This was one of the few chinks of light in a continuous long-term judicial stonewalling of Indian claims. Two decades later, on March 29, 2005, the Supreme Court reneged. The so-called liberal justice, Ruth Ginsberg wrote the opinion. The Oneida nation had purchased parcels of former tribal land and claimed property tax-exemption rights on grounds of its inherent sovereignty. The court ruled against the Oneidas. Why? Read Ginsberg.
We hold that the Tribe cannot unilaterally revive its ancient sovereignty, in whole or in part, over the parcels at issue. The Oneidas long ago relinquished the reins of government and cannot regain them through open-market purchases from current titleholders. […] We now reject the unification theory of OIN [Oneida Indian Nation] and the United States and hold that the standards of federal Indian law and federal equity practice, preclude the Tribe from rekindling embers of sovereignty that long ago grew cold.
Rekindling embers? Embers, by definition, are still alight, though faintly so, like the waning hopes of the Oneida Nation for a fair hearing. Embers need no rekindling. What needs rekindling is Justice Ginsberg’s lexicon. Instead of the poetic, “embers,” she should have sought a more apt metaphor for Indian sovereignty rights, "ashes," for example. But whatever she pleases to call the extant traces of Indian sovereignty, in the opinion of the court, they grew moribund because of the nature of the Indian appeal. It seems that the Indians delayed too long. The land has been developed. The wrongs done occurred too long ago. That stifling, actually a smothering, of original Indian sovereignty, was in large measure caused by the deceitful practices by the then government of New York who never possessed the legal standing to make treaties with the Oneida Nation in the first place. Ginsberg’s Supreme Court opinion is heir to the sad legacy of earlier decisions. If the American Indians cannot regain their sovereignty on a mundane matter about real estate why should corporations and other institutions be allowed to continue to steal the Indians most cherished birthright, that is, the very names of their nations. To make products and sports teams, to brand and label, to further trivialize and thus demean American Indians by making their names grist for the mills of capitalism, is obscene. Is there no court that would hear this case?
One can almost smell the stench of burned-out Indian villages, the lone dog crying, bodies – men, but mostly women and children. It could be Wounded Knee Creek or Sand River or the Chiricahua Mountains but it’s really everywhere. So-called battles, in fact massacres, where soldiers were awarded Congressional Medals of Honor for murdering men, but mostly women and children. But alas for the Oneida Nation, too much time had elapsed since the original possession of their new purchase. The legal tenet is called the doctrine on “long acquiescence.” But is not that the very point that needs legal redress? Indeed, the American Indians have been suffering from their long, painful acquiescence for centuries. The Court added that “the principle that the passage of time can preclude relief has deep roots in our law.”  Deep roots indeed, and nothing can be deeper than the unmentioned taproot that nurtures the legal discrimination that has fallen heir to the American Indians. For it feeds from the most vile – and most effective combination of all biases: religious and racial prejudice, a winning combination for bigots everywhere. The first footnote appended to the Justice Ginsberg’s opinion asserted the precedent of the Doctrine of Discovery, a doctrine whose provenance springs from Christianity in the days when the popes would wheel and deal, curry favor and gain fealty with princes and kings of the temporal world. The social and humanistic logic of this is most definitely NOT impeccable. In fact it is sordid and will be discussed later.
Under the doctrine of discovery, County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y., 470 U. S. 226, 234 (1985) (Oneida II), fee title to the lands occupied by Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign, first the discovering European nation and later the original States and the United States.
So just like that, the Indian argument was vitiated. How nice, as soon as the Indians were "discovered" they went from owner to tenant. Precedents, precedents, the axis of the legal world spins on precedents. All because of a unilateral, self-dealing doctrine, invoked from a time before the United States existed as such. The doctrine has been consistently applied for one express purpose: to render the American Indians politically and legally powerless. And Ruth Ginsberg is regarded as a liberal judge! One referential footnote is a powerful thing. It speaks to the millennium of malfeasances done to Indians by the white race. The1985 case of Oneida v. Oneida noted that certain “well-defined” principles had much earlier come into legal being that dealt with tribal ownership of property and conveyance, that is, sale. These unnamed principles held that the Indian nations could occupy and use the property, but that the discovering nations owned them. Only the discovering nation, which soon became the government of the United States, could consent to their sale. The opinion held that:
It was accepted that Indian nations held “aboriginal title” to lands they had inhabited from time immemorial. The “doctrine of discovery” provided, however, that discovering nations held fee title to these lands, subject to the Indians’ right of occupancy and use. As a consequence, no one could purchase Indian land or otherwise terminate aboriginal title without the consent of the sovereign. 
Well, who said so? What does this doctrine really mean? How was it devised, and revised? How can the law maintain such a powerful, one-sided precedent? Were the American Indians ever represented, by counsel or by the government, as a competent party in the determination of the Doctrine of Discovery? Doesn’t the issue demand such mutuality? After all, just because the Spanish had ships didn’t mean that they weren’t also “discovered” at the same time by the Indians. The Europeans didn’t know exactly what they were indeed discovering, except, like their biblical God, they saw that it was good. And what was best was land. In 1802 at Plymouth, Massachusetts, John Quincy Adams rubbed a generous handful of salt into their wounds by saying that the Indians should be grateful to their usurpers.
The Pilgrims of Plymouth obtained their right of possession to the territory on which they settled, by titles as fair and unequivocal as any human property can be held. By their voluntary association they recognized their allegiance to the government of Britain, and in process of time received whatever powers and authorities could be conferred upon them by a charter from their sovereign. The spot on which they fixed had belonged to an Indian tribe, totally extirpated by that devouring pestilence which had swept the country shortly before their arrival. The territory, thus free from all exclusive possession, they might have taken by the natural right of occupancy. Desirous, however, of giving amply satisfaction to every pretence of prior right, by formal and solemn conventions with the chiefs of the neighboring tribes, they acquired the further security of a purchase. At their hands the children of the desert had no cause of complaint. On the great day of retribution, what thousands, what millions of the American race will appear at the bar of judgment to arraign their European invading conquerors! Let us humbly hope that the fathers of the Plymouth Colony will then appear in the whiteness of innocence. Let us indulge in the belief that they will not only be free from all accusation of injustice to these unfortunate sons of nature, but that the testimonials of their acts of kindness and benevolence toward them will plead the cause of their virtues, as they are now authenticated by the record of history upon earth. 
Adams conveniently attributes the good fortune of the Pilgrims in having the tribe in residency from time immemorial “completely extirpated.” This is not so. Alfred Crosby writes, “the Massachusetts tribe was nearly completely exterminated.”  So the tribe was there, dramatically reduced, but there. Regardless, it is obvious that Adams is vastly more intent on defending the legitimacy of the title to the land than evincing any concern for the catastrophic circumstances of the Indians. The pestilence was not caused by God. It was brought to American shores by the European invaders, a sort of softening-up-the-resistance biological warfare. Adams’ kind and benevolent “whiteness of innocence” founding-fathers-of- Plymouth-Colony gave great thanks to their God for these exterminating epidemics. “Thus farre hath the good name of God favored our beginnings […]“In sweeping away great multitudes of the natives […], a little more before we went thither, that he might make room for us there.” 
Cotton Mather, the Puritan minister we met earlier, had directed his thanks heavenward that “the woods were almost cleared of those pernicious creatures, to make room for better growth” Noble Cook in Born To Die ascribes the epidemic to French fur traders “who in 1612 clashed with natives in the Massachusetts Bay area” or Dutch trading ships plying the Hudson River at about the same time.  Ample recorded evidence exists of the immunity of Europeans. As Alfred Crosby wrote in his study of the biological consequences of 1492, The Columbian Exchange, “The records of every European people who have had prolonged contact with the native peoples of America are full of references to the devastating impact of Old World diseases.”  The European invaders were impervious to the contagion, but the Indians suffered grievously. Crosby further noted that, “not one of them ever felt their heads to ache, while they stayed there.”  Historian Donald Hopkins stated that from 1617 to 1619 smallpox “wiped out nine-tenths of the Indian population along the Massachusetts coast.”  The truth is that many tribes were affected along the entire eastern seaboard and were decimated by disease soon after the establishment of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. The self-justificatory writing of John Adams is typical early American fare. Self-justification and power walk hand in hand.
One of the greatest examples of this resides in the Doctrine of Discovery, as developed by John Marshall, first chief justice of the Supreme Court. The courts of today are still inserting language like “aboriginal title,” “time immemorial,” “discovering nations,” and “Indian country,” and we have already seen the “first footnote.” In fact, the Doctrine of Discovery was developed over time through the accretion of quite shaky precedents, misstatements, and outright fraud. There is also a distinct pairing of pre-Columbian era thinking with the age of Andrew Jackson and the Supreme Court of John Marshall. Both aspects are vital ingredients to understanding the tragedy of the American Indian. By reviewing these two eras, the mentality of the white conqueror and occupier is laid bare and the slender moral and logical underpinnings for such a peremptory, and inequitably reasoned doctrine excavated. Furthermore, the application of western law in those early, pre-Columbian days was heavily theological. This divine tonality set the stage for the Christian religious fundamentalism that spurred the exploration and exploitation of the new world that was to ultimately be the United States of America. To allow the concept of the Doctrine of Discovery to remain viable in the annals of American jurisprudence by simply asserting its existence is to cure a disease by citing biblical evidence of miracles.
The Marshall Trilogy—A Tragedy in Three Acts From 1823 to 1832, the U.S. Supreme Court headed by John Marshall, the longest serving chief justice in history (34 years), issued three case opinions that formed the latter day U.S. version of the Doctrine of Discovery. It was dubbed The Marshall Trilogy since it was devised from rulings on three separate Indian cases brought before Marshall’s Supreme Court.
Tribal sovereignty had always been within the purview of the Supreme Court, supposedly acting as an honest broker between the rights of the beleaguered American Indians and the desires, mostly insatiable, of the invading and now occupying citizenry of the United States. As mentioned earlier, there are two legal concepts that drive Supreme Court decisions regarding tribal sovereignty. One holds that the sovereign powers of tribes predate “first contact,” that is the landing of Columbus on San Salvador in 1492. The second formulation delimits Indian sovereignty to what Congress opts to cede to the tribes. Supreme Court decisions vary in their theoretical grounding. As we have seen in the Ginsberg opinion, the Doctrine of Discovery guides the Supreme Court to this day, and so do precedents from rulings devolve from the Marshall Trilogy.
Case 1. Johnson v. McIntosh (1823): The Court ruled that Indians could not sell their land to private parties without the consent of the government. This ratified a long held international doctrine (the Doctrine of Discovery) that had been applied to European colonization since 1436 when the pope gave Portugal authority to colonize all of Africa. Thus, the discovering nation owned the land; Indians merely occupied it, with rights only to sell it to the government. In other words, the government was sovereign with preemptive rights, the Indians mere tenants, though they had been there from, to borrow a phrase from this case, from “time immemorial.”  In a real sense the Court had to rule this way. To say otherwise would cause chaos since all Indian-related land transactions since the US Constitution was ratified in 1788 were based on the sovereign right of the government to convey title. Of course, the ruling also affirmed the inferiority of the Indians as a class, as well as their incompetence to manage their affairs despite having done so quite admirably from time immemorial.
Case 2. Cherokee Nation v Georgia (1831): Fearful of being forced to move from their ancient tribal lands by the state of Georgia, the Cherokee Nation sought redress through the courts. Congress had passed the Indian Removal Act and President Andrew Jackson wanted the Indians out of Georgia, and out of his mind. So the issue for the Cherokees was one of last resort. But was the Cherokee Nation a foreign state and thus with legal standing to sue the state of Georgia? This is what the Indians argued. How modern of these soon-to-be displaced savages to seek such a method and argument for remediation. The Court ruled that the Cherokees could not sue Georgia. They were not a foreign nation, said the court, but something called a “denominated domestic dependent nation.”  Thus, they were unable to handle their affairs, hence completely dependent on the government. The word “nation” does not imply sovereignty warned the Court. Indian nations cannot treat with other countries and are mere dependencies, in a trust or ward-to-guardian relationship with the federal government.
What it all meant remains hard to articulate. Helpless Indians with a primordial right to occupy their land were a “foreign” nation on their own ancient lands. Yet by virtue of being neither white nor a conqueror, they had no right to sell or otherwise convey their property. Furthermore, the Indian Nation had no jurisdiction in which to bring suit. “If it be true that the Cherokee nation have rights,” Marshall said disingenuously, “this is not the tribunal in which those rights are to be asserted. If it be true that wrongs have been inflicted, and that still greater are to be apprehended, this is not the tribunal which can redress the past or prevent the future.”  Yet Indian Nations were deemed to be completely independent and foreign to boot. But they had neither legal standing nor a judicial process to file suit in order to protect its people. Thus, the longest standing inhabitants of America were denied citizenship and rights under the Constitution. The Cherokee Nation could not sue, and at the same time, was considered incompetent, and accordingly was completely dependent on the U.S. government. If not at the "supreme" court level of "tribunal" could these matters be decided, then where? Such a nonsensical decision stood only a year.
Case 3. Worcester v Georgia (1832): The third leg of the so-called Marshall Trilogy contained language that had the Orwellian substance of pure wind. White missionaries living among the Cherokees and supporting the Nation in its resistance to removal were ordered by state law to become licensed to reside on Indian land. But the Supreme Court ruled that the state of Georgia had no authority on Cherokee land and that the Cherokee Nation was a “distinct community.”
The Cherokee Nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this Nation, is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the Government of the United States. 
In fact, the Cherokees received nothing from this ruling in their favor. Worcester, the missionary imprisoned by Georgia, remained in jail for another year. No federal marshals were dispatched by the Supreme Court to enforce the decision. The Chief Justice straddled the fence very ably, not wanting to provoke a confrontation between a state and the federal government. This was hardly a profile in judicial courage.
They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the President as their Great Father. They and their country are considered by foreign nations, as well as by ourselves, as being so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political connexion with them, would be considered by all as an invasion of our territory and an act of hostility. 
Thus the supremacy of the federal government was firmly reestablished by this ruling, where it remains to this moment. State laws did not apply on Indian-occupied land, and Indians could reside on the land until it was abandoned. But none of it was enforced by the Supreme Court on the state of Georgia. And so in 1838, overrun by white settlers, connived out of their land by a fallacious treaty signed by bogus tribal chiefs, the Cherokees were dispossessed of their land and forced west of the Mississippi River. All Indians would remain incompetent wards of the federal government, and that was that.
No Way Out Essentially the Marshall Trilogy affirmed the following as being determinant factors in dealing with the American Indian problem:
1. The Doctrine of Discovery
2. The ward-to-guardian relationship between Indians and the federal government
3. No state has jurisdiction over Indian land or tribal issues. Only the federal government has this standing.
The Trilogy held that Indians did retain some aspects of aboriginal authority though this had been, and would continue to be severely diminished, if not voided by the federal government. It also supposedly defined more clearly the trust responsibility of the federal government. Maybe so in the abstract legal sense, but surely any trustee who would allow its ward to suffer the criminal and humanitarian transgressions experienced by the Indians would be summarily removed for incompetence and worse.
The torrent of suits regarding the dubious titles of former Indian land shows the ineffectiveness of the trusteeship rulings of the Supreme Court. Constitutionally, the plenary, that is, complete, power for dealing with the Indians is vested with Congress. Key to the application of the Doctrine of Discovery is that the federal government is the only legal agency empowered to deal with the Indians. If John Marshall can retrofit the Doctrine of Discovery after a void in the federal judiciary’s involvement in defending its Constitutionally endowed role of “trusteeship” then the shenanigans regarding illegal land deals should remain in play as well. Nonsense to the notion of Justice Ginsberg about rekindling ancient embers. Have generations of Indians just stood around gawking at the sky and wringing their collective hands? Sounds unlikely. These fires have never been extinguished, and many legal scholars agree. Here is one argument from Arlinda Locklear, the first Native American woman to argue a case before the United States Supreme Court..
New York State knew it had violated the law. New York State knew that it had covered this up for generations. New York State knew that the Iroquois people had complained consistently. The fact that the lawsuits were filed 150 years later is not a function of the fact that the Indian people slept on their rights, it is a function of the State’s own duplicity in, first of all, taking the land illegally, and secondly, doing everything in its power over the last 150 years to refuse to address and set right those wrongs. 
Ms. Locklear, a member of the Lumbee tribe of North Carolina, steadfastly maintains that Indians have the right to sue to regain tribal lands taken in violation of federal law, as was the case for the Oneida Indian Nation in New York.
All the classy linguistic formulations inherent in legal documents cannot hide the fact that from first contact with the white man, Indian sovereignty and their very civilization have been under attack and in decline. There is a long, bloody history of the abridgement of Indian political power. As a drum beats counterpoint during an execution, treaty after treaty was entered with the federal government, and soon thereafter reneged upon.
“They made us many promises, more than I can remember,” said Red Cloud chief of the Oglala Sioux, “but they never kept but one; they promised to take our land, and they took it.”  The power to treat (negotiate) with the federal government allowed legal proprieties to mask governmental malfeasance. No, said the government, we gave the Indians rights but they can’t handle their freedom. They are as children. We must protect them…from themselves. And the government protected their “wards” by having a mare’s nest of shifting principles and legislation dictate the nature of the living environment for the once proudly independent American Indians. As late as 2001, the Supreme Court further wounded the already dying question of Indian sovereignty. Joseph Singer, Professor of Law at Harvard University, lamented this assault on Indian rights and elaborated in the New England Law Review.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Nevada v. Hicks […] reverses the presumption of Worcester v. Georgia entirely, concluding that states have “inherent” powers in Indian country. The history and structure of the Constitution support the opposite conclusion. The Constitution took state power away from Indian country and vested it in Congress. The Supreme Court has, in Hicks, transferred a large portion of that power back from Congress to the states. In so doing, it has violated existing treaties and engaged in an act of conquest. This loss of tribal sovereignty is not something that happened long ago; it was accomplished by the nine Justices of the United States Supreme Court in their 2001 ruling in Hicks. 
While clinging to seemingly archaic precedents like discovery precepts of the first explorers where just sailing along a coastline cedes pre-emptive title to the nation since members of the crew are onlookers, Supreme Court decisions drift ever farther away from common sense. Now that all the land has been taken from the Indians, it is no longer important to have earlier protections in place. Like Humpty Dumpty, the law is what the Court says it is. Yet, the very same doctrine appears as a first footnote to justify the whole bloody mess, as in the previously cited opinion written by Justice Ginsberg. Philip Prygoski is equally pessimistic about the waning authority of tribal nations.
The Court has moved away from the concept of intrinsic tribal sovereignty that predated the coming of the European conquerors, and has adopted the view that tribal sovereignty, and the concomitant freedom of the tribes from encroachments by the states, exists solely because Congress has chosen to confer some protections on the tribes. 
The tribes complain: We have lost most of our land, now we are losing sovereignty over what we have left. Where is the law that deals with our rights? Prgoski adds:
Whatever the doctrinal underpinnings of tribal sovereignty may be, it is clear that the sovereignty of American Indian tribes has been progressively and systematically diminished by the actions of the federal government, including the Supreme Court.
My purpose for this particular exposition is not a legal one. Rather, I intended to show an example of the muddle that is the current state of American jurisprudence regarding the American Indians. Thus has it ever been, and indeed perhaps nothing can be done. Nevertheless, it is important to consider how this race of proud people has been repeatedly victimized by the American legal system. And THAT has always been the case! The essence of the American Indian’s standing in the courts of America has been that of a victim. The legal climate that surrounds the centuries-long mistreatment of the Indians forms a crucial pillar to examine the sordid roots of the dream that was in the process of becoming America. Sadly, the diminishment of the rights of American Indians continues.
The niceties of legal language and the silence of the Supreme Court about the fallacious European origins of the sui generis roots of the Doctrine of Discovery cannot be ignored. Indeed, how did this country, the United States of America, decide to directly exterminate millions of its aboriginal Indians? Only by examining the prevailing attitudes in those early times can one understand what drove these white citizens of America. Fueled by greed, impassioned by religion, armed with technological superiority, the white settlers strode ashore and the forests receded before them. The wild game and the Indians were doomed, not just to relocation but to death, and with a fervor.
ENDNOTES Chapter 8
 Supreme Court Opinion (SCO 3-855), Supreme Court of the United States, No. 03.855, City of Sherrill, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State et al, March 29, 2005. Sect. IA and II. http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-855.ZO.html
 Ibid.. footnote 1.
 Supreme Court Opinion (SCO 3-1065), Supreme Court of the United States, No. 3.1065, County of Oneida, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State et al, March 4, 1985. http://supreme.justia.com/us/470/226/case.html (SCO 83-1065, III, A).
 John Quincy Adams, “The Oration Delivered at Plymouth. December 22, 1802.” Orations of John Quincy Adams. Electronic Classics Series, Pennsylvania State University, 1998, p.21. http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/poldocs/orations.pdf
 Alfred W. Crosby, The Columbian Exchange:Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492, p. 41.
 Russell Thornton, American Indian Holocaust and Survival: A Population History Since 1492, p. 71.
 Noble David Cook, Born to Die: Disease and New World Conquest, 1492-1650, p.171.
 Crosby, op. cit., p.42.
 Ibid, p.41.
 Hopkins, Princes and Peasants: Smallpox in History, p.234.
 Supreme Court Opinion, Supreme Court of the United States, Johnson and Graham’s Lessee v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 5 L.Ed. 681, 8 Wheat. 543 (1823)http://supreme.justia.com/us/21/543/case.html
That from time immemorial and always up to the present time, all the Indian tribes or nations of North America, and especially the Illinois and Piankeshaws and other tribes holding, possessing, and inhabiting the said countries north and northeast of the Ohio east of the Mississippi and west of the Great Miami held their respective lands and territories each in common, the individuals of each tribe or nation holding the lands and territories of such tribe in common with each other, and there being among them no separate property in the soil, and that their sole method of selling, granting, and conveying their lands, whether to governments or individuals, always has been from time immemorial and now is for certain chiefs of the tribe selling to represent the whole tribe in every part of the transaction, to make the contract, and execute the deed, on behalf of the whole tribe, to receive for it the consideration, whether in money or commodities, or both, and finally to divide such consideration among the individuals of the tribe, and that the authority of the chiefs so acting for the whole tribe is attested by the presence and assent of the individuals composing the tribe, or some of them, and by the receipt by the individuals composing the tribe of their respective shares of the price, and in no other manner. Page 21 U. S.549-550
 Supreme Court Opinion, U.S. Supreme Court Ruling, Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia., 30 U.S. 1 (1831), 30 U.S. 1 (Pet.) January Term, 1831. http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0030_0001_ZS.html Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and heretofore unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government, yet it may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.
 Supreme Court Opinion, U.S. Supreme Court Ruling, Worcester v. State of Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832) 31 U.S. 515 (Pet.) 1832. http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0031_0515_ZS.html
 Supreme Court Opinion, U.S. Supreme Court Ruling, Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia., 30 U.S. 1 (1831), 30 U.S. 1 (Pet.) January Term, 1831. http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0030_0001_ZS.html
[17i] Arlinda Locklear, Morality and Justice:200 Years After the Fact, New England Law Review Vol. 37:3, 2002-2003, p. 610.
 Dee Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West, p. 449.
 Joseph W. Singer, “Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court’s Attack on Tribal Sovereignty.” New England Law Review Vol. 37:3, 2002-2003, p.659.
 Phillip J. Prygoski, From Marshall to Marshall: The Supreme Court’s changing stance on tribal sovereignty, Online.